DEPARTMENT OF LAW

UNIVERSITY

OF PENNSYLVANIA-

LAW REVIEW
AND AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
FOUNDED

VOL.

58 .S.
1.49 N. S.)f

1852

DECEMBER, 1909

NUMBER

THE CONSERVATION OF OUR NATURAL
SOURCES AND OF OUR NATIONAL
STRENGTH AND VIRILITY.

3

RE-

The enlightened thought of America is, to-day, becoming more and more directed towards the great need of
the conservation of our national resources and of our national strength and virility, and more and more does it
call out against the prodigal waste of life, and health and
natural resources which have, in the past, so characterized
our national growth. And yet few have realized how necessary to our courts is a knowledge and a consideration,
not merely of the law and of the decisions of the past, but
of political economy and sociology and of the history of
industrial evolution. All law and all legal decisions must
ultimately depend upon a popular support, and the public
will never be satisfied if the courts-when confronted with
great questions which are economic and social, and political
as well as legal, and which involve our national life and
prosperity-try to resolve them, not in the light of facts
and of science, but in that merely of authority and of precedent. Too often, for instance, our courts-when they
sustain child labor laws-sustain them, or at any rate justify their decisions, not on the broad ground of the necessity for such legislation and the fact that the child is the
(125)
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future citizen and in his health and morality and virility
the future of the nation depends, but on the theory that he
has always been looked upon as a ward of the state and
the 'state can legislate concerning him differently than it
can for adults and largely as it pleases. With this line of
reasoning the public is not satisfied. It cares nothing for
legal refinement. The fact is, that the child in the. early
English law was looked upon as a ward of the state merely
because the feudal king, or lord (who were then in a large
sense the state) were interested in his or her marriage, and
derived a fee therefrom, and were also interested in the
succession to real property as its owner would be their vassal
and their follower-"their man."
We have gotten far ahead of these primitive ideas and
our courts must, if we are to progress and our laws are
to have the support of an enlightened public mind and conscience, sustain these and similar statutes on the grounds
of their present necessity and justice and reasonableness,
and not on those of medieval feudalism. There is, indeed,
no necessity for this kind of reasoning and justification.
But for the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution, and their counterparts, which have been
engrafted into the Constitutions of the several states, there
would be no guarantees of personal or property rights whatever in our American law' and, as in England, our legislative bodies would be supreme. And even the guarantees
of property and of liberty and the stability of contracts,
which the constitutional provisions contain, have never in
the minds of thoughtful men, or of the courts themselveswhen these courts have been compelled to fairly and squarely
face the issues-ever been construed to guarantee unrestricted liberty or unlimited contractual or property rights.
The rights guaranteed have always been deemed subordinate
to the doctrine that the public welfare is the highest law,
and the theory that even the right to individual liberty
and property must yield to the paramount demands of
'Except that involved in the denial to the States of the power to
impair the obligations of contracts. See Art. I, Sec. io.
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the public welfare and the public necessity. Therefore, we
should justify child labor statutes, to-day, on the theory
that the welfare of the child is a matter of paramount state
concern, and often restrict liberty farther than it was ever
restricted before, because we have come to realize that restrictions which-formerly and in a different social organization-were unnecessary, are now necessary and imperatively demanded. In the same manner we should often
remove restraints which are no longer necessary.
As scientific knowledge and intelligence increases, and
Democracy grows, this interest in the individual, and in
the state, not as an abstract entity but as a collection of
individuals, must also grow, and often our legal theories
must be radically changed.
When Mr. Tiedman, in his admirable work on the "State
and Federal. Control of Persons and Property," said,"The police power of the Government cannot be brought
into operation for the purpose of exacting obedience to the
rules of morality and banishing vice and sin from the
world. The moral laws can exact obedience only in foro
conscientie. The municipal law has only to do with trespasses. It cannot be called into play in order to save one
from the evil consequences of his own vices, for the violation of a right by the action of another must exist or be
threatened in order to justify the interference of law," 2 he no doubt stated what, for a long time, was held to be
an established rule. How opposed is the rule, however, to
any healthy national growth, and how grounded in the
fatuities of medievalism. How opposed is it to the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, itself, that
"The State still retains an interest in one's welfare, however reckless one may be. The whole is no greater than
the sum of all the parts, and when individual health, safety
and welfare are sacrificed, or neglected, the state must
suffer."3
Page i8I.

'See opinion in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.
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It is true that private Vices were'not generally punished
under the early Common law. It is also true that originally
the majority of public offences were considered private and
the rule of private compensation, and of private revenge,
was practically the only rule. It is probably true that the
Court of King's Bench had, originally, criminal jurisdiction
over offences which were committed in the royal curtilage
merely, and that the offences of which cognizance was
originally taken were those merely which were deemed
committed against the peace and dignity of his Majesty the
King, and that other offences and those committed outside of the curtilage were the subjects merely for individual compensation and individual' revenge. But how
foolish, how unsocial was this theory! No man, as a matter
of fact, "liveth unto himself" nor "sinneth unto himself,"
and there is no vice and no wastefulness which is destructive of one's self, or of one's property, which does not react
harmfully on the community as a whole. Of course there
is such a thing as a reasonable and an unreasonable in-.
terference. That which is unreasonable can always, under
our constitutions, be prevented as an interference with liberty without due process of law, but the fact that the vice
or wastefulness, is indulged in in private, or with one's
own property, does not make a legislative inhibition by any
means necessarily unreasonable. The time has come when
we must do away with the petty distinctions of the middle
ages and cease from explaining exceptions, which are really
not exceptions at all, by antiquated theories and rules. Living issues must be settled on grounds of ever-living, everpresent, common sense. That is to say-if we ever expect
the public, as a whole, to respect and yield obedience to the
law and to the courts, or to make the law itself sufficiently
elastic for our growing needs. One great reason, indeed,
why the courts and the law are in the disrepute that they
undoubtedly are in to-day, is that our judges, instead of
explaining their decisions and holdings on grounds of fundamental sense, logic and equity, often write volumes in
attempting to reconcile these decisions, with those of the
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past or of neighboring jurisdictions, many of which have
been based on a social thought and a social system, in itself,
radically wrong or decided under conditions which are totally dissimilar. If, indeed, we may not prevent private
vice, what right have we to punish attempted suicide? It is
not enough to say that the old Ecclesiastical law punished
such acts, for, to-day, we have no Ecclesiastical law. The
foundation for the rule to-day, can only be that the state
can be no stronger than the sum of all its parts and that
the self-destruction of only one- citizen tends to lessen that
united strength.4 It is on this theory that we really regulate the employments of women and children, though many
of our courts, in sustaining the statutes, see fitto iesurrect
the feudal theory that the child and the woman are wards
of the state and can be dealt with differently than others.
On this theory we certainly can adopt reasonable regulations that tend to the prevention of private vices which lead
to a debilitated citizenship, even though they are indulged
in individually and alone. Attempted suicide, indeed, is
punishable, whether attempted on a public highway or in
the privacy of one's own chamber, and the use of opium
or morphine, and to a large extent of intoxicating liquors,
is a suicide to a greater or lesser degree. The same is true
of the foolish waste of one's substance, especially if that
substance, as is the case with standing timber and gas and
oil, is one in which the future generations should have an
interest or in which the public is itself directly concerned.
In the Arctic regions there would be strong grounds for
preventing the destruction of pack dogs, or of winter stores,
even though privately owned. Legislation of this kind is
not sumptuary in the proper sense of the term. Most of
the sumptuary legislation of the past, of which so much
complaint was made, was foolish and fanciful. It consisted
in unreasonable interferences with liberty, which were by
no means necessary for the protection of the public, or
4
This is one of the reasons given by Blackstone, though the insult
to the Deity is the one which is chiefly emphasized. See opinion in
Holden v. Hardy, i69 U. S. 366.
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which were radically partial in their operation. The use of
long shoes, or of cosmetics, or of paint, or of beaver coats,
did not seriously affect the welfare even of the user. The
evil of many of the old Sumptuary laws was that they were
aimed, not to prevent waste or even individual harm, but
to prevent the use by the common people of certain things
which were limited in their output and which the rich and
the governing classes themselves wanted. They did not
aim at the prevention of waste but of use altogether.
But do our constitutional provisions, as construed by the
courts, really prevent the safeguarding of our national
property and our national life? Do the constitutional provisions that-"No state may, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state shall be for the use of the Treasury
of the United States and all such laws shall be subject to
the revision and control of Congress,"-and theclausewhich
gives to Congress the power "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states and with the
Indian tribes," deprive the states of the right to protect their
own natural resources and to prevent their waste and extinction? Does the control which is vested in Congress
over interstate commerce, and do the clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments-which forbid the deprivation
of life, liberty and property without due process of law, or
forbid the denial of the equal protection of the lawsprevent a state from putting its resources to the fullest and
most beneficial use, and from conserving the same and the
lives and health of its peoples? These are questions which
are being raised every day and which will have to be dealt
with more and more as our population increases, our resources become exhausted, and the struggle for existence
grows keener and keener.
Perhaps the first case on the subject is that of McCready
v. Virginia,5 in which the Supreme Court of the United'94 U. S. 391.
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States sustained the validity of an act of the legislature of
Virginia, which forbade all persons, who were not citizens
of the state, to plant or dig oysters in the soil covered by
tide waters. The Supreme Court held, that this act was
neither a regulation of commerce nor a violation of any
privilege or immunity of national or interstate citizenship,
since, subject to the paramount right of navigation-the
regulation of which in relation to foreign and interstate
commerce has been granted to the United States,-each
state owns the bed of all tide waters within its jurisdiction.
"The planting of oysters in the soil covered by the water
owned in common by the people of the state," the Court
said, "is not different in principle from that of planting
corn upon dry land held in the same way. Both are for
the purpose of cultivation and profit

.

and as all

.

concede that a state may grant to one of its citizens the exclusive use of a part of the common property, the conclusion would seem to follow that it might, by appropriate legislation, confine the use of the whole to its own pepole
alone. .

.

. The right, thus granted, is not a privilege or

immunity of general, but of special, citizenship. It does
not belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governmnets,
but only to the citizens of Virginia, on account of the peculiar circumstances in which they are placed.

.

.

. They

own it not by virtue of citizenship, merely, but of citizenship and domicile united; that is to say,-by virtue of a
citizenship confined to the particular locality.

.

.

. Com-

merce has nothing to do with land while producing, but
only with the product after it has become the subject of
trade."
The next case is that of Smith v. Marvland,6 in which a
vessel, licensed in the coasting trade, was seized by the
Maryland authorities because of dredging for oysters in
Chesapeake Bay, in violation of the statutes of the state.
In it the statute was upheld on the theory of the exclusive
ownership in the state of the soil beneath the waters and
a 18 How. 71.
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also because the soil was held by the state "not only subject to, but in some sense in trust 'for, the enjoyment of
certain public rights, among which is the common liberty of
taking fish-shell fish as well as floating fish." The court,
however, took particular care to add that the Statute of
Maryland did not touch the subject of the common liberty of taking oysters, save for the purpose of guarding it
from injury, to whomsoever it might belong, and by whomsoever it might be enjoyed. "Whether this liberty," it
said, "belongs exclusively to the citizens of Maryland, or
may lawfully be enjoyed in common by all citizens of the
United States; whether the national Congress, by a treaty
or Act of Congress, can grant to foreigners the right to
participate therein; or what in general are the limits of the
trust upon which the state holds this soil, or its power to
define and control that trust-are matters wholly without
the scope of this case and upon which we give no opinion."
The same reasoning is applied in the case of Manchester
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,7 which follows, and
in which a Statute of Massachusetts was sustained which
regulated the use of nets or seines for taking fish in Buzzard's Bay, a bay wholly within the -State of Massachusetts
and whose mouth is less than two marine leagues in width.
In it the statute was upheld, not so much on the ground of
ownership as on the ground that the territory was within
the jurisdiction of the state, and the regulation did not interfere with commerce. "The Statute of Massachusetts,
which the defendant is charged with violating,"--the Court
said-"is, in terms, confined to waters within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth, ard it was evidently passed
for the preservation of the fish, and makes no discrimination in favor of citizens of Massachusetts and against citizens of other states. If there be a liberty of fishing for
swimming fish in the navigable waters of the United States,
common to the inhabitants and the citizens of the United
States (upon which we express no opinion), then the statiIx Sup. Ct. Rep. 559.
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ute may well be considered as an impartial and reasonable
regulation of this liberty, and the subject is one which a
state may well be permitted to regulate within its own territory, in the absence of any regulation by the United
States. The preservation of fish, even although they are
not used as food for human beings, but as food for other
fish, which are so used, is for the common benefit; and we
are of the opinion that the statute is not repugnant to the
constitution and the laws of the. United States."
The next case in order, and to be considered, is the case
of Geer v. Connecticut." In it the Supreme Court held it
competent for a state to prohibit the killing of game within
its borders with the intention of procuring its transportation beyond the state limits, and to forbid the transportation of any such game outside of the state. The case is
peculiar in that two of the judges, Mr. Justice Brewer and
Mr. Justice Peckham, not having heard the argument, took
no part in the decision, and two others, Mr. Justice Field
and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented. 9 The majority of the
court, however, seems to have repudiated the idea more
or less entertained by the Norman kings, and expressed by
Pothier in his Traite du Droit de Propriete,10 and which
seems to have had its origin in the Salic law, that-"The
right belongs to the king to hunt in his domain. His quality of sovereign gives him the authority to take possession, above all others, of the things which belong to no one,
such as wild animals. The lords and those who have a
right to hunt, hold such right, but from his permission, and
he can affix to his permission such restrictions and modifications as may seem to him good,"" and sustained the

a 16

Sup. Ct. Rep. 6oo.
'Mr. Justice Peckham and Mr. Justice Brewer are and always have
been the most pronounced individualists of the court.
" Nos. 27, 28 and 32.
" No. 32. The laws of Solon claimed no ownership of the game in

the State in any personal sovereign, but forbade the killing of game.
"seeing that the Athenians gave themselves up to the chase to the neg-

lect of the mechanical arts."
p. x28.

Merlin, 4 Repertoire de Jurisprudence,
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right of the state to prohibit the exportation of game on
the theory that it was a natural food supply, which needed
protection and which, though not owned by the sovereign
state or the sovereign monarch, belonged to all the people of
the state in common and was held by the sovereign state
in custody and trusteeship for them. It expilessly
recognized a property right in the people of the state which
could not be enjoyed by an outsider, without the consent of
such people, and which was not a privilege or immunity of
national or interstate citizenship, and2 resolved the interstate
commerce question in the negative.'
We now come to the consideration of the natural resources, of oil and gas, which are more or less migratory in
their nature and have often been aptly termed minerals feraF
natura. Of the cases on this subject the most important is
that of Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana,3 which was decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1899. In it
' In connection with this case a decision of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in the case of Rosmiller v. State, 89 N. W. Rep. 838, is
worthy of consideration. A statute of that State imposed a tax on
all ice cut on the meandered lakes of the State for export purposes.
It seems to have been conceded on all sides that the tax would have
been invalid if levied upon ice cut upon private waters, and the ownership of the State in the ice and the resulting right to sell the same
to whomsoever and in whatsoever manner it chose was, therefore, the
express and only theory on which the act was sought to be justified.
The Court, however, held that the waters in the meandered lakes and
in the flowing streams were not owned by the State as a State, but
held in trust by the State for the use of all of its citizens. The duty
of the State, the Court held, is "To preserve to the people of the
State forever the common rights of fishing and navigation and such
other rights as are incident to public waters at the common law." Such
rights it held included the right to cut and use the ice thereon. This
trusteeship, the opinion said, had again and again been held to be inviolable, the State being deemed powerless to change the situation by in any
way abdicating its trust. It cited cases where the State had been held
to be precluded from selling or granting away the bed of a lake, or
allowing it to be drained, and it deduced from these cases the natural
conclusion that it could not sell the water nor the ice. It therefore
resolved the question into one of protection of the property of the
State and the preservation of its use to the people thereof, and held
that the exportation in the quantities threatened would neither materially lessen the water supply of the State nor so drain the lakes as
to make them stagnant pools and injurious to health.
2177 U. S. 190; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576, affirming: State v. Ohio Oil
-Co., 15o Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 8og; Oil Co. v. Indiana, 155 Ind. 461, 57 N. E.
912.
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the court held, that a Statute of Indiana-which provided
that it should be unlawful "to permit the flow of gas or oil
from a well to escape into the open air without being confined within the well or proper pipes or other safe receptacle
for more than two days after gas or oil should have been
struck in the well,"-did not take the private property of the
owners of the land without adequate compensation and
therefore without due process of law, since the owner of
the surface had no property right in the gas or oil until
he had actually reduced it to pQssession, or, if he had any
property right therein, it was a right in common with the
co-equal right of other land owners to take from the common source of supply, and therefore subject to the legislative
power to prevent a destruction of the common property by
one of the common owners. The opinion in the case is one
of much value, not merely because of its luminous explanation of the problems which surround the conservation of the
oil supply, but because of its discussion of the case of Geer v.
Connecticut and the distinction which it makes between the
power of the state over animals and over minerals which
are ferce nature. In its opinion the court says: "Without
pausing to weigh the reasoning of the Indiana court, in order to ascertain whether they in every respect harmonize,
it is apparent that the cases in question, in accord with the
rule of general law, settle the rule of property in the State
of Indiana to be as follows: Although in virtue of his
proprietorship the owner of the surface may bore wells for
the purpose of extracting natural gas and oil until these
substances are actually reduced by him to possession, he
has no title to them whatever as owner. That is, he has
the exclusive right on his own land to seek to acquire them,
but they do not become his property until the effort has resulted in dominion and control by actual possession. It
is also clear from the Indiana cases cited that, in the absence of regulation by law, every owner of the surface
within a gas field may prosecute his efforts and may reduce
to possession all or every part, if possible, of the deposits,
without violating the rights of the other surface owners.
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If the analogy between animals ferce nature and mineral
14
deposits of oil and gas, stated by the Pennsylvania court
and adopted by the Indiana court,15 instead of simply establishing a similarity of xelation, proved the identity of the
two things, there would be an end of the case. This follows
because things which are ferae nature belong to the 'negative
community'; in other words, are public things subject to the
absolute control of the state, which, although it allows them
to be reduced to possession, may at its will not only regulate, but wholly forbid their future taking. But whilst
there is an analogy between animals ferae naturee and the
moving deposits of oil and natural gas, there is no identity
between them. Thus, the owner of the land has the exclusive right on his property to reduce the game there found
to possession, just as the owner of the soil has the exclusive right to reduce to possession the deposits of natural
gas and oil found beneath the surface of his land. The
owner of the soil cannot follow game when it passes from
his property; so, also, the owner may not follow the natural
gas when it shifts from beneath his own to the property
of someone else within the gas field. It being true as to
both animals fere nature and. gas and oil, therefore, that
whilst the right to appropriate and become the owner exists,
proprietorship does not take being until the particular subjects of the right become property by being reduced to actual
possession. The identity, however, is for many reasons
wanting. In things fere nature all are endowed with the
power of seeking to reduce a portion of the public property
to the domain of private possession. In the case of natural
gas and oil no such right exists in the public. It is.vested
only in the owners in fee of the surface of the earth within
the area of the gas field. This difference points at once to
the distinction between the power which the lawmaker may
exercise as to the two. In the one, as the public .are the
owners, everyone may be absolutely prevented from seeking
See Brown v. Vandegrift, 8o Pa. T42.
See Townsend v. State, z47 Ind. 624.
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to reduce to possession. No divesting of private property
under such a condition can be conceived, because the public are the owners, and the enacting by the state of a law
as to the public ownership is but the discharge of the
governmental trust resting in the state as to property of
that character. On the other hand, as to gas and oil the
surface proprietors within the gas field all have the right
to reduce to possession the gas and oil beneath. They could
not be absolutely deprived of this right which belongs to
them without a taking of private property. But there is a
co-equal right in them all to take from a common source of
supply the two substances which in the nature of things are
united, though separate. It follows from the essence of
their right and from the situation of the things as to which
it can be exerted, that the use by one of his power to seek
to convert a part of the common fund to actual possession
may result in an undue proportion being attributed to one
of the possessors of the right to the detriment of the others,
or by waste by one or more to the annihilation of the
rights of the remainder. Hence it is that the legislative
power, from the peculiar nature of the right and the objects
upon which it is to be exerted, can be manifested for the
purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by securing
a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment, by them,
of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the
like end by preventing waste. This necessarily implied legislative authority is borne out by the analogy suggested by
things ferce naturxe, which it is unquestioned the legislature
has the authority to forbid all from taking, in order to
protect them from undue destruction, so that the right of
the common owners, the public, to reduce to possession,
may be ultimately efficaciously enjoyed. Viewed, then, as
a statute to protect or to prevent the waste of the common
property of the surface owners, the law of the State of
Indiana which is here attacked because it is asserted that
it divested private property without due compensation, in
substance, is a statute protecting private property and preventing it from being taken by one of the common owners
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without regard to the enjoyment of the others. Indeed,
the entire argument upon which the attack on the statute
must depend involves a dilemma, which is this: If the
right of the collective owners of the surface to take from
the common fund, and thus reduce a portion of it to possession, does not create a property interest in the common
fund, then the statute does not provide for the taking of
private property without compensation. If, on the other
hand, there be, as a consequence of the right of the surface
owners to reduce to possession, a right of property in them
in and to the substances contained in the common 'reservoir
of supply, then, as a necessary result of the right of property, its indivisible quality, and the peculiar position of the
things to which it relates, there must arise the legislative
power to protect the right of property from destruction. To
illustrate by another form of statement the argument is
this: There is property in the surface owners in the gas
and oil held in the natural reservoir. Their right to take
cannot be regulated without divesting them of their property without adequate compensation, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and this although it be that if regulation cannot be exerted one property owner may deprive
all the others of their rights, since his act in so doing will
be damnum absque injuria. This is but to say that one
common owner may divest all the others of their rights
without wrongdoing, but the lawmaking power cannot protect all the owners in their enjoyment without violating
the Constitution of the United States."' 6
So far there appear to be no cases, in the Supreme Court
of the United States, which directly pass upon the question
as to whether a state may prohibit the exportation of
natural gas by pipes or otherwise, or the piping of oil
outside of its borders; although the reasoning of the case
of the Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana would seem to answer
the question in the negative 17 unless with perhaps the qual"SSee State v. Ohio Oil Co., i5o Ind 21; Oil Co. v. Indiana, 55 Ind.
461.
It Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct Rep.
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ification suggested by the New York case of Hathorn v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,' which we will afterwards consider. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, in several
noticeable cases of which Townsend v. State 9 and Manufacturers Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana2 ° are perhaps -the
most important, although admitting that a state may prohibit the waste of its natural resources of oil and gas before
they have been reduced to ownership, denies the right to
prohibit that exportation after they have been properly
reduced to individual possession. "In the case of wild animals, before they are reduced to possession," the Court
says, "the ownership is in the public and not in any private
person; and they are therefore held to be subject to the
protection of the sovereign. The privilege of taking, killing and transporting them may, on this ground, be regulated by the legislature. As to natural gas, however, the
public has no title to, or control over, the gas in the ground.
On the contrary, so far as it is susceptible of ownership, it
belongs to the owners of the superincumbent lands in common, or at least such land-owners have a qualified or limited ownership in it to the entire exclusion of the public. . . . It is not alleged in the complaint before us
that the appellee is appropriating an undue proportion of
the common fund or supply of gas, or that it is using any
device or artificial means to produce an unnatural flow of
gas from its wells to the injury of the appellants. Neither
is it charged that the means adopted by the appellee, for
transporting the gas are in any respects improper, dangerous
to life or property, destructive of the common supply, or
likely to inflict injury of any kind upon the appellants. The
right of the appellee to take gas from its own wells in the
manner adopted by it is not denied. Nothing done by the
529, would, perhaps, point to a different conclusion; but in this case
navigable waters and the public were concerned and different considerations might apply.
"87 N. E. Rep. 504.
147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. ig.
S53 L. R. A. 134.
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appellees is complained of excepting only, that it removes
natural gas out of the State of Indiana. No ground for
the exercise of the police power of the state to prevent
such removal is shown. Nothing save the naked right
to transport the gas beyond the limits of the state is contested in this action. The only reason which can be urged
in support of the restraint which is sought to be imposed,
is that the supply of natural gas being limited, and the
article being one of great value and convenience, its use
ought to be reserved for and enjoyed by the people of this
state, to the exclusion of the inhabitants of any other state.
But as natural gas, when reduced to possession, is held to
be a commercial commodity, its owners cannot lawfully be
prevented from carrying it to, and selling it in, whatever
market they may consider most advantageous."
Following this case, however, and almost a part of it, is
the so-called "Flambeau Light Case,"' 21 in which the same
tribunal takes an advanced and salutary position on the
subject of the wasteful use of natural products and sustains
a statute which seeks to prevent "the use of natural gas
for illuminating purposes in what are known as Flambeau
Lights." "It is true," the Court says in this latter case,
"that natural gas when brought to the surface and secured
in pipes is property belonging to the person in whose pipes
it is secured. But the act in no way deprives the owner of
the full and free use of his property. It restrains him
from wasting the gas to the injury of others or to the injury of the public. It might present a very different and
serious question whether the legislature has the power to
prevent him from wasting his own property, if by so doing
he in no way injured others, as appellants learned counsel
erroneously assume. In Gas Co. v. Tyner 22 this court, appropriating the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Gas Co. v. Dewitt,23 said: 'Water and oil, and
'Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. Rep. ig; Given v. State

66 N. R. 75o.

131 Ind. 277.
z3O Pa. 235, I8 At. Rep. 724.
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still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if
the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals ferr natura.
In common with animals and unlike other minerals they
have the power and tendency to escape without the volition
of the owner. Their fugitive and wandering existence
within the limits of a particular tract is uncertain. They
belong to the owner of the land, and are a part of it, so
long as they are on, or in it, and are subject to his control;
but when they escape and go into other land, or come under
another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession
of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant owner, drills
his own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes into his
well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his.'
It is not to prevent an adjoining or distant owner from
doing this, that the act in question was passed. But it
was to prevent him from needlessly wasting the gas which
he is drawing from the general reservoir which nature has
furnished, and which, experience and prudence teach, is
liable to be exhausted. It was further said in the Tyner
case, from which we have just quoted: 'The rule that the
owner has the right to do as he pleases with or upon his
own property is subject to many limitations and restrictions, one of which is that he must have due regard for
the rights of others. It is settled that the owners of a lot
may not erect and maintain a nuisance thereon, whereby
his neighbors are injured.' By the Tyner case supra, this
court has likened natural gas and laws regulating the same,
to wild game and laws regulating the taking of such animals. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Rodnza, 2 4 having under consideration the constitutionality of
a certain game law of that state, said: 'We take it to
be correct that the ownership of wild animals, so far as
they are capable of ownership, is in the state, not as a
proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity, as the representative and for the benefits of all its people in common. The
258

Minn. 393.
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preservation of such animals as are adapted to consumption as for food, or to any other useful purpose, is a matter
of public interest; and it is within the police power of the
state, as the representative of the people in their united
sovereignty, to enact such laws as will best preserve such
game and secure its beneficial use in the future to the
citizens, and to that end it may adopt any reasonable regulations, not only as to the time and manner in which such
game may be take and killed, but also imposing limitations
upon the right. of property in'such game after it has been
reduced to possession.'"
In this connection we should also notice the somewhat
peculiar and contradictory case of Hague v. Wheeler,25 to
which we will again refer, and which, although it ignores
the rights of the adjacent property owners, asserts, perhaps
more emphatically and noticeably than any other decision,
the rights of the community as a whole and of the consuming public. In this case the defendants caused a well
to be drilled, on their premises, which produced gas in
large, but in hardly paying quantities; but never used or
marketed the same. Later their derrick was destroyed by
fire and the gas escaped into the air. The defendants
refusing or neglecting to shut it in, the plaintiffs did so at
their own expense and the well remained in this condition
for some time, when the defendants threatened to reopen
the well and allow the gas to escape and be wasted as
before. The plaintiffs, who were the owners of adjoining
land in the same gas belt or area, sought to enjoin such
reopening and such waste, alleging in their bill that the
flow of gas from the well of the defendants was so great
that it would, if allowed to go to waste, seriously and
irrevocably injure their wells by draining the common supply. The court refused the injunction, and in doing so used
the following language:
"The acts complained of were the drilling of the well in
189o, when the wells of both the plaintiffs were in full
I Hague v. Wheeler,

Co., 57 Ohio St. 317.

i57

Pa. St.

324, 27

Ad. 714; Kelly v. Ohio Oil
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operation, and the subsequent failure to utilize or shut in
the gas. The drilling of the well was accounted for, and
the suggestion of malice or negligence therein negatived by
proof that it was done at the instance of the gas company.
This company had a considerable gas plant, and was engaged in the supply of gas to its consumers for fuel. It
was interested in the development of the region, and evidently expected to buy the defendants' well if it was of
sufficient size to be capable of utilization. The defendants
and the gas company could not agree upon the price of
the well after it was drilled, but the fact that it was drilled
at the request of the company, and not of the mere motion
of the defendants, was an answer to any allegation of
malice or negligence on the part of Hague as well as on the
part of the company, since it accounted for the act of
drilling by assigning a motive therefor, both lawful and
neighborly. It will not do to say that an act thus accounted for as to one plaintiff may be assumed to be the
result of malice or negligence as to the other, in the absence of proof to sustain the assertion. These plaintiffs
stand on common ground. Neither of them can complain
of the defendants for the act of drilling the well on their
land on any other ground than the existence of malice or
negligence. When the act is accounted for in such a manner as to show that it was not done with malice, or in
negligence, but in good faith, as an act of ownership, and
at the solicitation of the gas company, the character of the
act is established, and as a basis of relief it falls out of
the case. What have we then? Three landowners owning
considerable holdings in the same basin, or overlying the
same gas-bearing sand rock, each having an open gas
well or wells on his land, drilled without malice or negligence, in a lawful manner, and for a lawful purpose. Two
of these owners have been able to utilize the gas from their
respective lands and find a market for it. One of them has
not been so fortunate. He has gone from his well, but up
to the time of the filing of this bill he has not been able to
utilize or dispose of it, and his gas has gone to waste for

144

CONSERVATION

OF OUR NATURAL

RESOURCES

that reason. His more fortunate neighbors come into a
court of equity, and ask that he shall not be permitted to let
his gas run, because, while this gas is his own, underlying
his tract, and finding its way to the surface through his
well, it has a tendency to drain the sand rock, and so to
reduce ultimately the flow of gas from their wells. This
would be equally true if the defendants were able to utilize
their gas; yet it is conceded that in that case their right
to the gas from their well would be as incontestable as the
right of the plaintiffs to use the gas from theirs. How
is that right lost? By their inability to find- a purchaser?
If they can find a purchaser, or turn the well to any useful
purpose, their right to the gas that flows from their well
is conceded. If they cannot, their right is denied. Their
well must be shut in, while their successful neighbors drain
the entire basin through their open wells, and receive pay
for the gas. This is a proposition to limit the power of
the owner over his own by the use he is able to make of it.
.If he can sell his gas or his oil, or turn it to some practical
purpose, his power over it as owner is unabridged. If he
cannot find a purchaser, or a practical purpose to which
to apply his yield of gas or oil, then his power as owner is
gone. This would be an adaptation to actual business of
the spiritual truth that 'to him that hath shall be given;
but from him that hath not shall be taken away, even that
which he seemeth to have.' Does the maxim, 'sic utere tuo
non alienum ldas,' require us to grant the relief sought in
this case? If in burning the gas from their well the defendants should direct the jet towards the plaintiffs' buildings or timber, or should leave it uncontrolled, so that
the wind might drive it against or towards the plaintiffs'
property so as to injure or endanger it, a case would be
presented in which the maxim would be applicable, and
we should take pleasure in enforcing it. If the defendants'
well produced nothing, and they were leaving it without
plugging, so that the water might find its way into the
sand rock, to the injury of others, we could punish them
under the statute which prescribes the -manner of plugging
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an unproductive well, and makes it obligatory on the owner to adopt it. But we have a well drilled for a lawful
purpose, in a lawful manner, and actually producing gas,
which is not directed towards the property of another,
or so consumed as to affect the buildings, timber, or crops
of any adjoining owner. It is therefore not the use of
the gas of which the plaintiffs complain. It is the production of it when the owner cannot sell it or turn it to
any practical purpose. Now, it'is doubtless true that the
public has a sufficient interest in the preservationof oil and
gas from waste to justify legislation upon this subject.
Something has been done in this direction already, by the
acts regulating the plugging of abandoned wells, but it is
not the public interest that is involved in this litigation. It
is the interest of an adjoining owner who seeks to appropriate to himself so much of his neighbor's gas as he cannot
turn into money or use for some practical business purpose,
and he asks a court of equity to hold his neighbor's hands
by an injunction until this appropriation is accomplished.
We cannot find any rule of law or any principle of equity
on which such an injunction can rest. The scope of the
golden rule may be sufficiently ample to cover this case,
and it maybe that it would require an owner to surrender
to his neighbor so much of his own property as he could
not turn to his own advantage, if his neighbor was so situated that he could profit by it. Assuming this to be so,
the moral obligation so arising is not enforceable by civil
process. The owner of timber may pile it in heaps, and
burn it, as was done in the early settlement of the country,
notwithstanding the fact that his neighbor has a saw mill
and all the facilities for preparing the sawed lumber for
market and converting it into money. The power of the
owner of the timber over it is neither greater nor less
because of his neighbor's readiness and ability to market it.
An owner of land may have a deposit of coal under some
portion of it so small in extent, or with such an inclination,
as to make it impossible for him to mine through his own
tract without a greater cost to him than the value of the
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mined coal when brought to the 'surface. His neighbor
may have an open mine that reaches it, and through which
it could be brought at a fair profit. These circumstances
do not affect the title of the owner of the coal, or confer
any right on the adjoining mine owner; but it is said that
the oil and gas are unlike the solid minerals, since they
may move through the interstitial spaces or crevices in the
sand rocks in search of an opening through which they
may escape from the pressure to which they are subject.
This is probably true. It is one of the contingencies to
which this species of property is subject. But the owner
of the surface is an owner downward to the center, until
the underlying strata have been severed from the surface
by sale. What is found within the boundaries of his tract
belongs to him according to its nature. The air and the
water he may use. The coal and iron or other solid mineral he may mine and carry away. The oil and gas he may
bring to the surface and sell in like manner, to be carried
away and consumed. His dominion is, upon general principles, as absolute over the fluid as the solid minerals. It
is exercised in the same manner, and with the same results.
He cannot estimate the quantity in place of gas or oil, as
he might of the solid minerals. He cannot prevent its movement away from him, towards an outlet on some other
person's land, which may be more or less rapid, depending
on the dip of the rock or the coarseness of the sand composing it; but so long as he can reach it and bring it to
the surface it is his absolutely, to sell, to use, to give away,
or to squander, as in the case of his other property. In
the disposition he may make of it he is subject to two
limitations: he must not disregard his obligations to the
public, he must not disregard his neighbor's rights. If he
uses his product in such a manner as to violate any rule of
public policy or any positive provision of the written law,
he brings himself within the reach of the courts. If the
use he makes of his own, or its waste, is injurious to the
property or the health of others, such use or waste may be
restrained, or damages recovered therefor; but, subject

AND OF OUR NATIONAL STRENGTH AND VIRILITY

147

to these limitations, his power as an owner is absolute, until
the legislature shall, in the interest of the public as consumers, restrict and regulate it by statute."
This case, although adhering to what we believe to be
an obsolete and unsocial theory of individualism and of
individual property rights, can hardly be said to be reactionary. It takes such pains indeed to suggest that, though
the adjacent property owner has no remedy, the public
has, that all of its poison is extracted. It certainly is
authority for the proposition -for which we contend and
the acceptance of which is absolutely necessary to the conservation of our natural resources and of our national virility, that individual wastefulness Is a mattern of public
concern, and a fit subject for legislative regulation. In
this particular the Pennsylvania court perhaps goes further
than that of the other states and adopts what might almost
be termed a Salic theory, although modified by the fact
that the sovereign is to-day the consumer "his majesty,
the American public," and adopts, in relation to oil and
gas, a position somewhat similar to that now everywhere
adopted, in America, in relation to game.
No one of the other courts, it will be noted, directly
adopts this theory in relation to gas and oil. They merely
emphasize the differences which the cases actually present,
and the fact that there is a greater degree of, or claim for,
complete ownership in the owner of the land on which
the particular well is dug, in the case of oil and gas, than
there is in the case of game; that though oil and game may
both be, in a measure, migratory and ferce natur&e, game is
so to a greater degree than is oil and gas; that game goes
everywhere and belongs everywhere and that oil and gas,
though more or less migratory, are confined to certain
lands and to certain territories and are owned in common
by the owners of those lands rather than by the people of
the state as a whole. They all, however, with the exception of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania-and it goes
further-pave the way for, and suggest the holding and
important distinction which was only yesterday made by
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the Supreme Court of New York in the case of Hathorn v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,26 to the effect that, although
after reduction to possession, the right of property is complete, the method of reduction must be natural and reasonable and must not only not be wasteful but must not
be calculated to deprive the other land owners who have a
common interest in the supply of their legitimate rights.
In the case in question the New York Court of Appeals
was called upon to pass upon the validity of a statute which
was enacted for the protection of the naturl -mineral
springs of the State of New York and which prohibited
the acceleration or increase of the flow of percolating waters, or natural carbonic acid gas, from wells bored into
the rock by pumping or any artificial contrivances whatsoever: First, absolutely and without qualification; second,
when the result of so doing would be to impair the natural
flow or the quality of the waters or gas in the spring or
well of another person; third, when the object of so doing
was to extract and collect the carbonic acid gas for market.
The court held that the first and second prohibitions were
unconstitutional and took away the use and enjoyment of
private Property, as they seemed to prohibit a land owner
from extracting, by means of the simplest and most modest
contrivance, waters from a bored well on his premises
for purposes connected with the use of his premises, if the
well was in rock and the water contained mineral salts and
carbonic acid gas, even if it did not interfere with others;
while, as a matter of law, he had a vested right to draw
percolating water from under his lands, by pumps or otherwise, for purposes legitimately connected with the enjoyment of his lands even though it interfered with others.
The third prohibition, however, the court held to be constitutional. The landowner, it maintained, has no vested right,
unnaturally and unreasonably, to force the flow of percolating waters for any purpose not connected with the
use or enjoyment of his land. The court in its opinion
N. M
N'8

504.
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stated the question at issue to be-"Whether a landowner
has the right, by the use of pumps and other apparatus,
greatly to accelerate and increase the natural flow of subterranean percolating mineral waters and gas through deep
wells, bored into a widely extended common supply of
such substances, not for any purpose connected with the
enjoyment of his lands, but for the purpose of procuring
from the waters a supply of gas to be marketed throughout
the country, and with the result -of wasting great quantities of mineral waters, and of destroying or impairing the
natural flow of such waters and gas in and through the
springs of other landowners throughout a large area, and
of destroying or impairing the valuable character of such
waters for the purposes for which they have been habitually used." In passing upon the problem it, among other
things, said: "The earlier decisions, in this and other states,
laid down the general rule that a landowner might not be
enjoined from doing an act on his own premises which
resulted in diverting or even wholly destroying the flow
of percolating waters from, or upon, his neighbor's lands.
In thus holding they but followed the rule laid down in
the leading case of Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324,
wherein was approved the principle .'which gives to the
owner of the soil all that lies beneath its surface, that the
person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all
that is there found to his own purposes at his free will
and pleasure, and that if, in the exercise of such right, he
intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconvenience
to his neighbor falls within the description of dainnum
absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an action.' It will hardly be profitable to consider all of the
different reasons which led the courts to adopt these principles, but it is important to bear in mind that they were
invariably applying them to cases in each of which the
party complained of had interfered with the enjoyment by
another of percolating waters by some act which was directly and naturally connected with the improvement or
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enjoyment of his own land. Thus in the Acton case' the
act, which resulted in the interference complained of, consisted in mining operations on a man's own land. In the
case of Ellis v. Duncan the person intercepting the flow of
percolating waters on his neighbor's land had done so by
digging a trench or ditch and opening a quarry on his
premises. No question was presented in these cases of a
landowner depleting or exhausting a common supply of
underground waters by artificial methods for purposes not
in any way connected with the enjoyment or use of his own
lands. But with the increased demands .upon natural resources, such as water, this question did begin to arise. It
seems to have been first suggested in England, in the case
of Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349. There the
question arose whether the flow of percolating waters on
another's land might be diverted or destroyed by pumping
for purposes of supplying a municipality with water; and,
while it was finally held that this might be done, it was
only after the right had been seriously questioned. In
this state it was first discussed, though not actually involved, in Smith v. City of Brooklyn, and it was there
stated, by Judge Hatch, that the right in this state had
never 'been upheld in the owner of land to destroy a stream,
a spring, or well upon his neighbor's land, by cutting off
the source of its supply, except it was done in the exercise
of a legal right to improve the land or make some use of
the same in connection with the enjoyment of the land
itself, for purposes of domestic use, agriculture, or mining
or by structures for business carried on upon the premises.'
Finally, in the case of Forbell v. City of New York, the
question reached this court, and the necessity was recognized, not for an alteration of the rules which had been
applied by earlier cases to the facts then presented, but
rather for an enlargement and extension of such rules so
that they would be applicable to new conditions. That case,
for the first time in this state, at least laid down the rule
of the reasonable use of percolating waters, which I think
is applicable to, and controlling of, the facts in this case.
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There the City of New York tapped waters percolating under some lands purchased by it, and which were part of a
connected system or supply extending over a large area,
and then by powerful apparatus so forced the flow of this
water as to exhaust the supply which had formerly supplied
plaintiff's land, and this was done for the purpose of furnishing a supply of water for the defendant. The court,
reviewing many earlier cases passing upon the right of a
landowner to enjoy the subsurface waters under his premises, said: 'In the cases in which the lawfulness of interference with percolating waters has been upheld, either the
reasonableness of the acts resulting in the interference, or
the unreasonableness of imposing an unnecessary restriction
upon the owner's dominion of his own land, has been recognized. In the absence of contract or enactment, whatever it is reasonable for the owner to do with his subsurface water, regard being had to the definite rights of others,
he may do. He may make the most of it that he reasonably
can. It is not unreasonable, so far as it is now apparent,
to us, that he should dig wells, and take therefrom all the
water that he needs in order to the fullest enjoyment and
usefulness of his land as land, either for purposes of pleasure, abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture, or
for whatever else the land as land may serve. He may
consume it, but must not discharge it to the injury of others.
But to fit it up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and
potential reach that from their base the defendant can tap
the water stored in the plaintiff's land, and in all the region
thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return, is, however reasonable it may
appear to the defendant and its consumers, unreasonable as
to the plaintiff and the others whose lands are thus clandestinely sapped and their value impaired. The principles
thus adopted in the Forbell case have been fairly upheld in
the courts of other states.'"
On the question of irrigation and the agricultural and
industrial use of our waterways, there is much law and
much law to be settled and made. The courts of the coun-
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try at large will soon be called upon to definitely decide
whether they will follow the so-called riparian doctrine,
which is, that "those who own the soil adjacent to running
streams are held to own the soil to the center line of the
stream and, as an inseparable incident to that ownership,
to be entitled to have the water flow as it has been accustomed to flow from time immemorial, without material
diminution or alteration," or whether the newer doctrine
of "beneficial use and priority of use" which has so generally prevailed in the mining and arid states, will apply.
The Supreme Court of the nation will also be called upon
to decide, whether the duty of the nation to preserve the
navigability of our watercourses is paramount, or can be
surrendered to the increasing demands of the West for
more water for irrigation and of the East and South for
more water for power.
So far the doctrine of prior and beneficial use has had
the ascendency in America, especially in the arid sections of
the West. The doctrine grew up because, without the water,
without irrigation, much of the West would have been a
desert waste, and without the right to divert the streams,
the mining industry would have been at a standstill. It
has been applied not merely for the benefit of the riparian
owners, but for those within the same watershed, who, in
many states, have often been conceded the right to construct
their ditches and pipes through the property of the riparian
owners and to convey the water over enormous distances.
The question has even assumed the dignity of a state controversy on account of the fact that the inhabitants of the
state of Colorado, under the law of beneficial use and prior
occupancy, which prevails in that state, have exhausted the
waters of the Rio Grande, the Platte, the Arkansas, and
the Big Laramie Rivers, and although by doing so have
made the desert blossom within their own borders, have left
to the states of New Mexico, Nebraska, Kansas and Wyoming nothing but dry riverbeds.
Under the old theory of a use only by the riparian owner
to an extent which would leave the -flow as it has existed
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from time immemorial without material diminution or
alteration, the riparian owners on the lower parts of the
streams and in the adjoining states would have abundant
cause for complaint. But even they could not use these
streams for irrigation or for mining purposes; and the
doctrine of state sovereignty also intervenes. As Mr. Platt
Rogers, of Denver, remarked in a recent address before
the American Bar Association: "If such be the case," that
is, if the riparian doctrine applies as between states, "all
that you see of lawns, fields dnd orchards exists by the
grace of our adjoining and sister states, and the independence of Colorado, and its sovereignty within its own domains, is a myth. This great fabric of intermingled law
and labor is, we are sorry to say, in the judgment of the
Kansas legislature and her Attorney General, a house of
cards."
In passing upon the question, however, the Supreme
Court of the United States seems to have practically adopted
the doctrine of prior and beneficial use, even as between
the inhabitants of different states or the different states
themselves. It, however, hints at a doctrine of equality of
use as between the several states and of an ownership in
common between them, as is the general holding in regard
to the several owners of an oil or gas area. "Summing up
our conclusions," the Court says,2 7 "we are of the opinion
that the contention of Colorado of two streams cannot be
sustained; that the appropriation of the waters of the Arkansas by Colorado, for the purposes of irrigation, has
diminished the flow of water into the State of Kansas; that
the result of that appropriation has been the reclamation of
large areas in Colorado, transforming thousands of acres
into fertile fields, and rendering possible their occupation
and cultivation when otherwise they would have continued
barren and unoccupied; that while the influence of such
diminution has been of perceptible injury to portions of
the Arkansas valley in the State of Kansas, particularly
See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125.
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those portions closest to the Colorado line, yet to the great
body of the valley it has worked little, if any, detriment,
and regarding the interests of both states, and the right of
each to receive benefit through irrigation and in any other
manner from the waters of this stream, we are not satisfied that Kansas has made out a case entitling it to a decree. At the same time, it is obvious that if the depletion
of the waters of the river by Colorado continues to increase,
there will come a time when Kansas may justly claim that
there is no longer an equitable division of benefits, and
may rightfully call for relief against the action of Colorado,
its corporations and citizens in appropriating the waters of
the Arkansas for irrigation purposes."
In so far as the waters which are entirely within a state
are concerned, the proprietory rights of the people of that
state and the interest of the state, as trustee or guardian
of the interests of its people, seems to be fully recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the doctrine of McCready v. Virginia to have, in these modern
days, been amplified and confirmed. This, at any rate, is
the conclusion to be reached from a perusal of the case of
Hudson County Water Co. v. Robt. H. McCarter, Atty.
Gen. of the State of New Jersey,2 8 in which the water company was enjoined, under a contract with the City of Bayonne, in New Jersey, from laying mains in that city for the
purpose of carrying water to Staten Island in the State
of New York, the water to be drawn from the Passaic
River, and a statute was upheld which provided that it
should be "unlawful for any person or corporation to transport or carry through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals,
the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river
or stream of this state into any other state for use therein."
"All rights," the court says in its opinion, "tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all
in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of
policy which are other than those on which the particular
=28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529.
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right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached. The limits set
to property by other public interests present themselves as
a branch of what is called the police power of the state.
The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but
points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by
decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer
or farther side. For instance, the police power may limit
the height of buildings in a city, without compensation. To
that extent it cuts down what would otherwise be the rights
of property. But if it should attempt to limit the height
so far as to make an ordinary building lot, wholly useless,
the rights of property would prevail over the other public
interest, and the police power would fail. To set such a
limit would need compensation and the power of eminent
domain. It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary stones
between the private right of property and the police power
when, as in the case at bar, we know of few decisions that
are very much in point. But it is recognized that the state,
as a quasi sovereign and representative of the interests of
the public, has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere,
the water, and the forests within its territory, irrespective
of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land
most immediately concerned.2 9 What it may protect, by
suit in this court, from interference in the name of property
outside of the state's jurisdiction, one would think that
it could protect, by statute, from interference in the same
name within. On this principle of public interest and the
police power, and not merely as an inheritor of a royal
prerogative, the state may make laws for the preservation
of game, which seems a stronger case.3 0 The problems of
irrigation have no place here. Leaving them on one side
it appears to us that few public interests are more obvious,
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the
"Citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552;
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 2o6 U. S. 23o, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68.
"Citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 5i9.
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interest of the public of, a state to maintain the rivers that
are wholly within it substantiall r undiminished, except by
such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit, for the purpose of turning them to a
more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent
wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as the
population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of the
opinion, that the private property of riparian proprietors
cannot be supposed to have deeper roots. Whether it be
said that such an interest justifies the cutting down by
statute, without compensation, in the exercise of police
power, of what otherwise would be private rights of property, or that, apart from statute, those rights do not go to
the height which defendant seeks to do, the result is the
same. But we agree with the New Jersey courts, and think
it quite beyond any rational view of riparian rights, that an
agreement of no matter what private owners, could sanction
the diversion of an important stream outside the boundaries
of the state in which it flows. The private rights to appropriate is subject, not only to the rights of lower owners but,
to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and
health. We are of the opinion further, that the constitutional power of the state to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use
or speculation as to future needs. The legal conception of
the necessary is apt to be confined to somewhat rudimentary wants, and there are benefits from a great river that
might escape a lawyer's view. But the state is not required
to submit even to an esthetic analysis. An analysis may
be inadequate. It finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may keep
and give no one a reason for its will. The defense under
the Fourteenth Amendment is disposed of by what we have
said. That, under Article I, Section io, needs but a few
words more. One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power
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of the state by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.3 1
But the contract, the execution of which is sought to be
prevented here, was illegal when it was made. The other
defense also may receive short answers. A man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in commerce
among the states. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise
limited and qualified right to the same end. The case is
covered in this respect by Geer v. Conn.,32 and the same
decision disposes of the argumeht that the New Jersey law
denies equal privileges to the citizens of New York. It constantly is as necessary to reconcile, and to adjust, different
constitutional principles, each of which would be entitled to
possession of the disputed ground, but for the presence of
others, as we already have said that it is necessary to reconcile and to adjust different principles of the common law.8 3
The right to receive water through pipes is subject to territorial limits by nature, and those limits may be fixed by
the state within which the river flows, even if they are made
to coincide with the state line. Within the boundary citizens
are as free to purchase as citizens of New Jersey. But this
the defendant, which is a New
question does not concern
4
3

Jersey corporation.1

There seems, then, to be no question that wasteful and
injurious methods of use may be forbidden where others
have a residuary interest, or an ownership in common, in
the article or property.35 Such is undoubtedly the case with
percolating waters; and in those states and places where
oil and gases are held to be percolating in their nature or
'Citing Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434,
Ct. Rep. 531; Manigault v. Springs, ig U. S. 473.
3I61

23

Sup.

U. S. 519.

' Citing Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 485.
'"The Wisconsin case of Rosmiller v. State, 89 N. W. 238, which
at the first glance might appear to be opposed to this decision, may be
easily reconciled if we remember that in it there was no evidence or
suggestion or argument that there was not enough ice and to spare,
and that the exportation thereof threatened either the water supply
or the health of the people of the State in any way.
I But see, contra, Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. St. 324.
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to exist in underground streams witlr gases and oils. It
is true of running waters. It may.even be true of forests
and of mineral deposits. 30

Some courts even go further

and hold, that the use must be one which either improves
the land of the user or makes it possible to make some use
of the same in connection with its enjoyment for purposes
of domestic use, agriculture or mining, or by structures for
business carried on upon the premises.37 The more general
and better rule, however, seems to be that the use must be
reasonable; that the owner of the land or of the natural
deposit or supply may use it for means not connected with,
or necessary for, the enjoyment of his land; but he may
not, by extraordinary means and for such foreign purposes,
exhaust or materially diminish the sources and supply which
originate or are found on the properties of others.38 "In
the cases in which the lawfulness of interference with percolating waters has been upheld," says the Supreme Court
of New York, in the case of Forbellv. City of New York,89
"either the reasonableness of the acts resulting in the interference, or the unreasonableness of imposing an unnecessary restriction upon the owner's dominion of his own land,
has been recognized. In the absence of contract or enactment, whatever it is reasonable for the owner to do with his
surface water, regard being had to the definite rights of
others, he may do. He may make the most of it that he
reasonably can. It is not unreasonable, so far as it is now
apparent to us, that he should dig wells, and take therefrom
all the water that he needs in order to the fullest enjoyment
and usefulness of his land as land, either for purposes of
pleasure, abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture,
or for whatever else the land, as land, may serve. He may
consume it, but must not discharge it to the injury of others.
"See opinion of Justices, i03 Maine, 5o6.
"See cases cited and discussed in Hathorn v. Carbonic Gas Co.,
87 N. E. Rep. 504.

" See cases cited and discussed in Hathorn v. Carbonic Gas Co.,
87 N. E. Rep. 504.
W164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644.
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But to fit it up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and
potential reach that from their base the aefendant can tap
.the water stored in the plaintiff's land, and in all the region
thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and, by merchandizing it, prevent its return, is, however reasonable it may
appear to the defendant and its customers, unreasonable as
to the plaintiff and: the others whose lands are thus clandestinely sapped and their value impaired."
The number of cases, indeed, which deny the right to a
use of one's real property which is detrimental to others, and
which concede the right of the legislature to interfere for
the good of the public as a whole, is fortunately growing
and the reasoning of the so-called "Spite Fence Cases" is
becoming more and more to be discountenanced. "Rights
of property," says Mr. Justice Shaw, in the case of Commnonwealth v. Tewkesbury,4" "like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitation
in that enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations
established by law as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in it by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient," and there should be no
dissent to this statement. The "Spite Fence Cases," indeed,
-in their concession of an almost unlimited right of use to
the owner of real property, and in holding that he may
build any structure thereon that he may desire, however useless, and suggested by no matter what malicious motives, as
long as he does not trespass on the lands of others, or impair1
4
the right of lateral support, or commit a public nuisance,
-merely pretend to express the Common law and rarely
deny, or negative, the right of the legislature to prohibit
uses which are useless to the owner and injurious to others.4 2 In recent years, indeed, the courts have gone even
further. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the
"Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, and cases cited in notes to this
case in 4o L. R. A. 177.
' See cases cited in notes to Lefts v. Kessler, 4o L. R. A. 177.
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recent case of Georgia v. Tennessee,43 has enjoined a Tennessee corporation from so smelting-its ores so as to, injure
the forests of Georgia, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has by dicta, at any rate, conceded the right of the legislature to prevent the waste of natural gas in order that the
consuming public may not .suffer and may be benefited,"
and the Supreme Court of the State of Maine has recently
given an answer in the affirmative to the question--"In
order to promote the common welfare of the people of
Maine by preventing or dfmiishing, injurious- drought and
freshets, and by protecting, preserving, and maintaining the
natural water supply of the springs streams, ponds. and
lakes, and of the land, and by preventing or diminishing
injurious erosion of the land and the filling up of the rivers,
ponds, and lakes, and as an efficient means- necessary to
this end, has the legislature power under the constitution
by public general law to regulate or restrict the cutting or
destruction of trees growing on wild, or uncultivated land,
by the owner thereof, without compensation therefor to such
owner ?" 4 5 So, too, it is now well settled that a state, as
a trustee of the welfare of all of its citizens, may protect its
property and natural resources against other states and their
peoples, even though the ownership of such property and resources may have passed into private hands. 46 These cases
are healthy and stimulating. Even if in certain respects
subject to technical criticism, they, at any rate, evince a determination to act upon broad lines of public policy and to
not allow Anglo Saxon and revolutionary individualism,
and the apparent exigencies of the moment, to militate
against the public interest whether that interest be present
or future.
As applied to our natural resources, indeed, the theory
of an absolute ownership is illogical and absurd and the
" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 2o6 U. S.
"Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. St. 324.
"Opinion

of the Justices, w03 Me.

230.

5o6.

"Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U. S. 230.
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doctrine of the so-called "Spite Fence Cases" is barbarous
and reactionary. It is, in fact, doubtful whether the ownership of land, or even the right to carry on business, was at
any time in our legal history absolute and unrestricted. It
was certainly not so under the feudal system and in feudal
England, nor even in the Saxon and English England which
came before. The constitutional provisions to the effect
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law," and that "private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation being made therefor," and which guarantee the "equal
protection of the laws," could certainly have never been
intended to authorize private uses which were unsocial in
their nature. They were merely intended to prevent legislative action which was such. The doctrine of the "Spite
Fence Cases," indeed, and of the Pennsylvania Court, in
the case of Hague v. Wheelee', except in so far as the latter
case concedes the right of the legislature to interfere on
behalf of the consuming public, is socially wrong. It is
based on an individualism which has no foundation in legal
history and which this age will not tolerate. Our recent decisions, indeed, when taken as a whole, point more and
more to the conclusion that our courts stand ready to lend
their sanction to any and all reasonable legislation which
shall look towards and encourage, and that they themselves
will, from time to time, formulate a judge-made law which
shall encourage the creation of a jurisprudence, both state
and national, which shall cease to surrender our national resources and national virility to the fetich" of individual liberty and private right of property. They are beginning to
resolve the question-"Am I my brother's keeper?"-in the
affirmative, and to recognize the existence of a common
humanity and of a state and national solidarity. They are
beginning to evince a concern for the generations that are
to come and for the states and the nation of the future
which those generations will compose. They are coming to
realize, as never before, that the welfare of the state is
the highest law; that the whole is made up of the
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sum of all of its parts, and that if the individual citizen
suffers and is retarded in growth and" development, the
state itself is to that extent weakened and undermined.
Andrew Alexander Bruce.
Grand Forks, North Dakota.

